Schelker Mark

On the Economics of Remembering and Forgetting in the Digital Age Publication Archived

Unabhängige Finanzkontrolle in der Demokratie Publication Archived

Rechnungshöfe spielen eine zentrale Rolle in der Demokratie. Im Verbundmit Informations- und Offenlegungspflichten bilden sie das Rückgrat einer transparenten Staatsführung. Um die Aufsichtsrolle wahrzunehmen, ist eine institutionelle Ve...

Auditor Expertise: Evidence from the Public Sector Publication Archived

Public Auditors are fundamental institutions to supervise government agents. Withoutaccurate information principals would find it hard to make adequate decisions. Since agents face strong incentives to misreport, competent audits of financi...

Auditor Terms and Term Limits in the Public Sector: Evidence from the US States Publication Archived

Improving transparency and enabling the principal to hold its agents accountable is a majorissue in any principal agent relationship. This paper focuses on the role of public auditors in this task and presents evidence on the impact of audi...

Rethinking Public Auditing Institutions: Empirical Evidence from Swiss Municipalities Publication Archived

In the economic literature various political institutions designed to control the government have been analyzed. However, an important institution has been neglected so...

Auditors and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Public Sector Publication Archived

Corporate auditors review and evaluate financial statements. To enhance independence the selection process and mandatory auditor rotation requirements have been debated intensively. The available empirical evidence is not conclusive and suf...

Public Auditors: Empirical Evidence from the US States Publication Archived

Public auditors should reduce agency problems and improve transparency. We address the question of whether auditors should be elected by the citizens or appointed by either the legislature or the executive, and explore the influence of cond...