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Trust in International Organizations: An Empirical Investigation Focusing on the United Nations

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Working Paper No. 2006 - 20

CREMA Gellertstrasse 24 CH - 4052 Basel www.crema-research.ch

TRUST IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION FOCUSING ON THE UNITED NATIONS

By

Benno Torgler *

Abstract:

The literature on social capital has strongly increased in the last two decades, but, there still is a lack of substantial empirical evidence about the determinants of trust. Most studies have focused on social or generalized trust, while those investigating international trust or trust in international organizations are rare. This empirical study analyses a cross-section of individuals using micro-data of the World Values Survey wave III (1995-1997), covering 38 countries, to investigate trust in international organizations, specifically trust in the United Nations. The results suggest that not only socio-demographic and socio-economic factors have an impact on citizens' trust in the UN, but also political factors. We also observe externalities. Political trust at the state level leads to a higher trust at the international level. On the other hand, if a state is perceived as dysfunctional, the level of trust declines.

JEL classification: Z130, D730, O190

Keywords: International Organizations, United Nations, Trust Social Capital, International Perspective, Political Interest.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Social capital has been studied by many different disciplines. It has advanced to an important concept in social sciences, enforcing the interdisciplinary discourse among researchers such as historians, political scientists, anthropologists, economists, and sociologists on the one hand and policy makers and non-academic institutions such as the World Bank that developed a Social Capital Initiative on the other hand. Moreover it also encouraged the discussion within the disciplines (see Woolcock 1998). The literature has stressed the importance of social capital for effective governance and for facilitating coordinated actions (see, e.g., Putnam 1993). In the public finance literature, Slemrod (1998) argues that social capital, derived from the willingness to pay taxes voluntarily, lowers the cost of the operating government and of equitably assigning its cost to citizens. Many authors have singled out social capital as an important feature of productive social relationships (Gambetta 1988, Hardin 1993). Trust can be seen as the social capital of a society. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) point out that social capital and trust lead to a better functioning of public institutions and help in case of market imperfections. The environmental literature has shown that social capital influences transaction costs and the effectiveness of public policies, which helps to resolve environmental conflicts (see, e.g., Paavola and Adger 2005). Several previous studies have shown that trust has an impact on economic and fiscal performance (see Knack and Keefer 1997, La Porta et al. 1999, Knack 1999, Zak and Knack 2001 and Schaltegger and Torgler 2005) and also the willingness to cooperate in society (see, e.g., Torgler 2003, 2005, 2006). However, Brewer et al. (2004) point out that "To date, no research has directly studied international trust" (p. 94). The authors stress the relevance of scholars casting their attention not just on the familiar forms of trust, but on other forms as well. To measure international trust they used the following questions: *Generally speaking, would you say that the United*

States can trust other nations, or that the United States can't be too careful in dealing with other nations? Would you say that most of the time other nations try to be helpful to the United Sates, or that they are just looking out for themselves? Thus, the authors extend previous studies that focused on *generalized trust* by including an international dimension. In this study we extend the previous studies with a focus on political and institutional trust at the state level (trust the government, the legal system and the parliament) focusing on individuals' trust in international organizations. Surprisingly, there is a lack of empirical studies having investigated institutional trust at the international level. Our empirical study analyses a cross-section of individuals using the World Values Survey wave III (1995-1997) using micro-data that covers 38 countries to shed some light on the determinants of trust in international organizations with a focus on the United Nations. The UN have the unique advantage to be an international organization including 191 sovereign states, representing virtually every country in the world, and therefore a global association of governments aiming at facilitating co-operation in international law, international security, economic development, and social equity (see http://www.un.org/)[1]. Thus, it might be highly relevant to investigate what shapes the confidence in the UN, as such international institutions have received substantial and increased attention in the debates over world affairs (Brewer et al. 2004). One of the major advantages of the data set is that different cultural regions can be investigated, i.e. we can assess the cross-culture robustness of our variables we used. It should be noted that we are not working with the newest available survey, as some of the variables, such as the corruption an individual perceives, have not been collected in the newest wave. Our results suggest that not only socio-demographic and socio-economic factors have an impact on citizens' trust in the UN, but also political factors. We also observe externalities. Political trust at the state level leads to a higher trust at the international level. On the other hand if a state is perceived as dysfunctional, the level of trust declines also internationally. . Finally, we

[1] It should be noted that Switzerland and Serbia, included in our data set, were not members at the time the survey was conducted. Switzerland joined the UN in 2002, Serbia in 2000.

also observe regional differences, with the lowest levels of trust in Western societies. Section II of the paper introduces the concept of trust and Section III the data and measures. Section IV then presents the empirical findings and Section V finishes with some concluding remarks.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Grootaert (2001, pp. 10-11) stresses that there are three major views on social capital: First, the concept developed by Putnam (1993) interpreting social capital as a social network, as networks of civic engagement facilitating coordination and cooperation. Second, Coleman's (1988, p. 598) approach defines social capital as "a variety of different entities", consisting of some aspects of social structure and facilitating certain actions of actors. This allows taking into account not only horizontal but also vertical social relationships. The third concept considers the social and political environment that enforces norms and shapes social structures. According to Paldam (2000, p. 630), there are three families of social capital concepts: trust, cooperation and network. He points out "most people build *trust* in and *networks* to others and come to *cooperate* with them" (p. 629). Trust and cooperation are closely related. He defines social capital as the ability of a person to work voluntarily together with others, for a common purpose in groups and organizations (p. 635). But what exactly is trust? There are different conceptualizations of trust. Uslaner (2002) differentiates between moralistic trust and strategic trust. Strategic trust reflects "expectations about how other people *will* behave" (p. 23). On the other hand, "moralistic trust is a statement about how people *should* behave. *People ought to trust each other*" (p. 23). Thus, moralistic trust works also in the absence of reciprocity. In a further step, Uslaner (2002) points out that the distinction between strategic and moralistic trust is a "continuum from particularized to generalized trust" (p. 26). Generalized trust is the belief that most people can be trusted and thus does not depend upon specific individual or group characteristics. To measure

generalized trust, many researchers have relied upon the following survey question: "Generally speaking, do you believe *most people* can be trusted or can't you be too careful in dealing with people?" On the other hand, particularized trust is the belief that only specific individuals or groups can be trusted[2]. Our investigation focuses on trust in an international organization and therefore is connected to particularized trust, it relies strongly on experiences with the United Nations (or knowledge about them) rather than generalized trust, which is related to moralistic trust. Uslaner points out that the "central idea distinguishing generalized from particularized trust is how inclusive your moral community is" (pp. 26-27). It indicates that not only well-known people are trusted but also strangers. Particularized trust can be measured using group categories to classify people in their own network at the local level, for example, asking survey questions regarding respondents' trust in their neighbors, friends, co-workers or family and club members, but also asking questions regarding the level of trust in institutions at the state or international level. Our investigation in this paper grounds basically on the third concept, which takes into account a more formalized institutional relationship between an organization and citizens at the vertical level. Thus, our paper focuses on a specific dimension that is strongly connected with institutional trust at the international level. A higher level of trust in the UN enhances their accountability.

A higher accountability may help the UN to be more flexible in adapting to new circumstances. On the other hand, trust may influence opinions about specific policy decisions and policy acceptance at the international level. Political scientists have also shown that public opinion about world affairs can influence voting behavior and public policy (Aldrich et al. 1989 and Shapiro and Jacobs 2000). Therefore, it may be interesting to focus on the determinants of trust in the UN.

[2] Other researchers use similar concepts, for example, thin and thick trust, bonding and bridging social capital, personal and social trust (see, e.g., Williams 1988, Putnam 1993, 2000, Rahn and Transue 1998).

III. DATA AND MEASURES

The data used in the present study are taken from the World Values Survey, a worldwide investigation of socio-cultural and political change, based on representative national samples. It was first carried out in 1981-83, and subsequently in 1990-91, 1995-96 and 1999-2001. Data from these surveys are made publicly available for use by researchers interested in how views change with time. The researchers who conduct and administer the World Values Survey (WVS) in their respective countries are required to follow the methodological requirements of the World Values Association. Surveys are generally based on national representative samples of at least 1000 individuals, ages 18 and over (although sometimes people under the age of 18 participate). The samples are selected using probability random methods and the questions in the national surveys generally do not deviate far from the original official questionnaire.[3] We will focus on the third wave using a data set that covers 38 countries. As mentioned in the introduction, we do not work with the fourth wave, as there not all independent variables relevant to our study were collected (e.g., perceived corruption). The World Values Survey offers the great opportunity to investigate a broad set of possible determinants. The question on trust in the UN is phrased as follows:

> *I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? The United Nations.*

Our dependent variable TRUST IN UN has the value 4 for a great deal of confidence and 1 for none at all.

We will use an ordered probit model to analyze the ranking information of the scaled dependent variable. A weighting variable has been applied to correct the samples and thus to

[3] A typical World Values Survey can be viewed at www.worldvaluessurvey.org.

get a reflection of the national distribution. Moreover, the original weight variable was multiplied by a constant for each country to get an equal number of weighted observations (around 1500) for each survey. The World Values Survey provides the weighting variable. Countries with fewer than 750 observations (Montenegro, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Pakistan, and Tambov) were excluded from the sample to reduce possible biases due to a lack of representativeness. Several other countries were excluded, as they don't provide information regarding the dependent and independent variables integrated in our estimations[4]. Finally, Sweden could not be included as one of the control variables (education) is coded differently. We proceed with a sample of 38 countries[5]. The estimations are also performed for various geographic sub-samples to compare the relevance of our independent variables in different environments.

Independent Variables

First of all, we consider several socio-demographic and economic variables. *Table A1* in the Appendix provides a description of these variables. Previous studies have shown the importance of these factors when investigating trust. For example, Brewer et al. (2004) find a negative correlation between age and international trust. They stress that the experiences older Americans have made during their formative years foster a generalized distrust of other nations. Education has a positive, but not a statistically significant impact on international trust. On the other hand, it had a statistically significant impact on internationalism. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find that trust in others increases with age but at a declining rate, and that women have a lower level of trust compared to men[6]. The authors also find that income

[4] These countries are Poland, Japan, South Africa, Puerto Rico, China, Columbia.
[5] Western Europe Countries & USA & Australia (USA, Western Germany, Eastern Germany, Switzerland, Australia, Norway, Finland, Spain), CEE and FSU (Bulgaria, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Armenia, Russia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina), Latin America (Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Venezuela, Uruguay) Asia (South Korea, India, Taiwan, China, Philippines, Bangladesh), Africa (Nigeria).
[6] They argue that groups that were historically discriminated have a lower level of trust.

and education are positively correlated with trusting others, stressing that professional success increases individuals' trust in others. Glaeser et al. (2000) find similar results, but stress that such findings have multiple interpretations. The positive effect of education on trust may occur because more educated people are associated with other more educated people who are trustworthier. On the other hand, education may raise social skills or increase the possibilities to reward and punish other individuals. However, it can be argued that not only formal education matters, but also informal education, such as, for example, political interest. Compared to other determinants, the aspect of political interest has been widely neglected in the social capital literature. Such a variable might be highly relevant when focusing on trust in the UN[7]. Well-informed citizens may be better aware of the UN efforts, which may support their trust in such an international organization. However, they are also in a better position to assess the efficiency of the UN which may have a positive or a negative impact on their trust level, depending on how the UN act. We also control for marital and employment status. Married people may have a higher level of institutional trust, because they are more constrained by their social network and often strongly involved in the community (Tittle 1980)[8]. They furthermore might be more concerned with international problems than singles as the "parent effect" makes them seek their children's future welfare. In the results of Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) marital status was uninfluential. On the other hand, Glaeser et al. (2000) report that married persons are more trusting.

We also control for the level of risk aversion with a dummy variable. The aim of the UN is among other things to maintain international peace and security and to cooperate in solving international, social, cultural and humanitarian problems (see http://www.un.org/aboutun/basicfacts/unorg.htm). More risk averse individuals may have

[7] We use the following question to measure political interest: How interested would you say you are in politics? (4=very interested, 1= not all interested). The results remain robust when using alternative proxies such as importance of politics (Question: How important is politics in your life (4= very important, 1= not at all important).

[8] However, it can be argued that a stronger involvement at the *local* level may lead to a stronger skepticism toward international organizations that are acting more centralized.

higher preferences for such aims, which may help to create a higher level of identification and trust. Moreover, controlling for risk attitudes allows for better insights regarding the variables of age, gender, or economic situation. It could be argued that results related to the socio-demographic and socio-economic factors may be driven by different risk attitude functions. Hartog et al. (2002), for example, found in an empirical survey analysis that an increase in income reduces risk aversion.

We also control for religiosity. However, rather than asking about the degree of religiosity directly, we include religiosity proxied by frequency of church attendance,[9] which approximates how much time individuals devote to religion, an aspect that traditional research has so far neglected (Iannaccone 2002). Interestingly, Alesina and La Ferrara find that religious affiliation of the respondents did not affect trust. They conclude "that it may be the case that it is not the religious beliefs per se but the organized forms of religion in different parts of the world that may influence differently social behavior" (p. 220). The frequency of church attendance indicates that people spend time devoted to religion. Both involve ties to others, and religious activities might support the norms of a larger community (see Tittle and Welch 1983). The church as an institution induces behavioral norms and moral constraints among their community. Because religion can be seen as a proxy for such characteristics as work ethic, tolerance, and trust (La Porta et al. 1999), it acts as a sanctioning system that legitimizes and reinforces social values. Religious organizations thus provide moral social constitutions and, to a certain extent, act as "supernatural police" that enforce accepted rules (Anderson and Tollison 1992). Thus, religion has a comparative advantage in producing or encouraging social goods in large cultures of intermediate complexity whose central government is too weak to enforce property rights (Hull and Bold 1994). The aims of the UN are similar to the ones churches promote (dealing with social, cultural and humanitarian

[9] Corresponding question: Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often, never or practically never. (7 = more than once a week to 1 = never or practically never)

problems etc.) and thus their influence may help to increase individuals' trust in the UN. On the other hand, similar purposes may lead to a certain level of competition, which would reduce the level of trust in the UN.

Finally, we consider variables that approximate the state capacities. Not only the international environment may influence international trust or trust in international organizations, but also the domestic political environment (Brewer et al. 2004). The current situation in a country may affect the level of trust in international organizations. Brewer et al. (2004) stress that citizens who are cynical about domestic politics should be cynical about international relations as well (p. 97) and therefore might be cynical as well about international institutions. Citizens who believe that their own government does not fulfill their expectations may reason that international bodies may even be less able to satisfy their preferences. On the other hand, the UN may offer an alternative channel to resolve problems in dysfunctional states and regions which may lead to higher levels of trust in the UN among those citizens affected by state's weaknesses. In developed countries states offer many feasible channels for citizens' actions and expressions of preferences. The democratic structure allows individuals to a certain extent control and influence the government. Furthermore, the government has a higher incentive to take into account citizens' preferences. On the other hand, weak and dysfunctional states lead people to pursue their goals through non-governmental sector or to develop trust in international organizations. As a first measure we will use perceived corruption. To assess the level of perceived corruption from the WVS, we use the following question:

> How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in this country?
> Almost no public officials are engaged in it (1)
> A few public officials are engaged in it (2)
> Most public officials are engaged in it (3)
> Almost all public officials are engaged in it (4)

The variable perceived corruption is in line with other indexes such as the Transparency International that also measures perceptions. However, perceptions are neither objective nor quantitative measures of the actual degree of corruption. It is an indirect way of measuring corruption (Tanzi, 2002). However, analyzing the Transparency International Treisman (2000, pp. 410-411) brings good arguments why data based on perceptions should be taken seriously. Components of the used surveys and ratings are highly correlated, although they have been made with different methodologies, different inputs and in a different time period. Such a consistency allows to conclude that factors are almost free of biases such as a "temporal mood" or guesses. There is also a consistency in the Transparency International over time, although the construction of the index varies over time. Finally, the index is strongly correlated with other corruption indexes such as the ICRG, the BI or the Gallup International. Tanzi (2002) points out: "If corruption could be measured, it could probably be eliminated" (p. 38).

A good feature to test whether the World Values Survey question about PERCEIVED CORRUPTION is a useful proxy is to check whether the variable is correlated with other well-known indexes on corruption. Thus, we compare our variable with the corruption indexes TI (Transparency International), International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and Quality of Government (Control of Corruption) developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003). The World Values Survey Corruption ratings are highly correlated with the TI (r= -0.878), the ICRG (r=-0.680) and the Quality of Government rating (r=-0.827)[10].

The social capital literature has stressed the important consequences of social and institutional trust for mass political judgments covering also world affairs (see, e.g., Brewer et al. 2004, Brewer and Steenbergen 2002). Brewer et al. (2004) investigate empirically the impact of social trust and political trust on international trust. Their results indicate that

[10] The sign is negative because for all three ratings used (TI, ICRG and Quality of Government), a higher score corresponds to a lower corruption.

generalized trust in other people and generalized trust in the government affect international trust, generalized trust having a stronger effect than trust in the government. They also show that social trust and political trust are distinct from international trust. Moreover, they stress in their conclusions that "In broader terms, our findings indicate that social trust and political trust are not the only forms of trust that future research on mass opinion should study. We expanded the existing line of research to include international trust, but there may be other politically important forms of generalized trust as well" (p. 106). It is therefore highly relevant to investigate trust at the international level. In our study we also investigate the impact of generalized trust and trust in the government on trust in the UN. However, contrary to the variable CORRUPTION, we include social and political trust *sequentially* in the estimations to meet any possible criticism of similarities with our dependent variables. Moreover, we will investigate a broad variety of trust factors at the state level and therefore go beyond trust in the government, and we will develop an index that summarizes all the different aspects in one variable (see Appendix Table A1).

The models also include regional dummy variables for the CEE and FSU (Central and Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union countries), LATIN AMERICA, ASIA and AFRICA[11], leaving the industrialized economies of WESTERN EUROPE, USA, and AUSTRALIA in the reference group.

IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

This section reports two groups of estimation results: a panel analysis of all 38 countries (*Table 1*) taking also into account endogeneity aspects (*Table 2*) and presents panel estimates from four geographic regions (*Tables 3* to *6*). The primary objective is to investigate the

[11] Only one country represents Africa (Nigeria).

robustness of our independent variables across countries with different cultural and institutional characteristics and with different levels of economic development.

Since the equation in an ordered probit model is nonlinear, only the signs of the coefficients can be directly interpreted and not their sizes. Calculating the marginal effects is therefore a method to find the quantitative effect of an independent variable. The marginal effect indicates the change in the share of individuals (or the probability of) belonging to a specific trust in the UN level when the independent variable increases by one unit. If the independent variable is a dummy variable, the marginal effect is evaluated with regard to the reference group. Furthermore, “I don’t know” answers and missing values were omitted from all estimations.

Table 1 presents the first results using the entire panel of countries. First we present an estimation including corruption, but neither generalized trust nor trust in the state. In a second approach we only include generalized trust. The last two estimations include trust in the state, first as an index and in a second step including all single factors. We observe that all age groups from 30 to 65+ report a significantly lower probability of trusting the UN than the reference group. The strongest effect is observable for the age group 30-49. Being in this age group rather than the youngest one reduces the probability of stating that the UN can be trusted a great deal by around 2 percentage points. Similarly, the coefficient of the category 65+ is statistically significant with marginal effects between 1.4 and 2.1 percentage points. The group 50-64 is on the other hand less skeptical (coefficient is on the border of being significant with marginal effects below 1 percentage point). Gender differences and differences regarding the marital and employment status are not observable. However, formal education has a positive impact on the level of trust. The coefficient is always statistically significant. Informal education or in other words political interest is also positively correlated with trust in the UN. The first two estimations indicate that an increase in the level of political interest increases the probability of stating that the UN can be trusted a great deal by 1.2 or

1.3 percentage points. However, the coefficient loses its statistical significance after including the trust variables. Interestingly, a better economic situation reduces the trust in the UN quite significantly. Moving to the upper class reduces the highest level of trust between 2.7 and 3.9 percentage points. Brewer et al. (2004) also found a negative correlation between income and international trust, but the coefficient was not statistically significant. This result shows that investigating trust in international organizations the income variable works in the opposite direction than for generalized trust. High-income individuals may believe that international organizations are less important to guarantee their success, which may lead to a lower level of trust. *Table 1* also shows that risk attitudes don't affect trust in the UN. Looking at the first two estimations we can conclude that church attendance is positively correlated with a higher trust. Such a result would support churches' function of reinforcing social values. On the other hand, once we control for state's trust, the coefficient switches its sign without losing its statistical significance and therefore supporting in a stronger manner, for example, the competition argument. However, it should be noted that the marginal effects are not very high. Similar tendencies are observable for the variable corruption. The first estimations indicate that a higher level of perceived corruption leads to a lower level of trust in the UN, which supports Brewer et al.'s (2004) argument that a lower level of government quality reduces trust at the international level. The marginal effects are around 2 percentage points. However, once we control for political trust, the coefficients get negative with lower marginal effects of 0.6 percentage points. Such results indicate that a higher level of perceived corruption increases the trust in the UN, holding individuals' political trust constant. Looking at the estimations 2 to 4, we can conclude in line with Brewer et al. (2004) that social trust and political trust have a positive effect on trust at the international level. However, contrary to Brewer et al. (2004) we find that generalized trust affects our dependent variable to a lesser extent than political trust. The coefficient of generalized trust loses its significance after controlling for political trust. This is not a surprise taking into account that their international

trust variable (trust other nations) can be seen as an extension of generalized trust at the local level. On the other hand, our trust variable is more closely connected to institutional or particularized trust. *Table 1* shows that the impact of trust in state's institutions is quite substantial. An increase in the index by one unit raises the share of individuals at the highest trust level by 3.1 percentage points. The fourth estimation in *Table 1* indicates that all subcomponents are statistically significant with marginal effects between 1.7 and 3.4 percentage points. The strongest effects are observable for the variables trust in the parliament and the legal system. Thus, these results indicate strong externalities. Political trust at the state level leads to a higher trust at the international level. On the other hand, when a state is perceived as dysfunctional trust at the international level decreases. We also find regional differences in terms of trust in the UN. Interestingly, inhabitants of LATIN AMERICA, ASIA and AFRICA have a higher level of trust in the UN with high marginal effects between 3.3 (CEE/FSU) and 13.7 percentage points (AFRICA). Thus, Western societies are more critical of the UN. One reason could be that they are less in the position of benefiting from such an international institution and less dependent on the adequate functioning of such an institution. However, these results should be interpreted with due caution as the number of countries in each region is limited.

To check the robustness we also worked with models that use a standard error adjusted for the clustering on countries, thus taking into account unobservable country specific characteristics. In general, clustering leads to a decrease in the *z*-values, but has no impact on the marginal effects. The results remain robust. The political trust variables are all statistically significant and generalized trust loses its significance once we control for political trust. Corruption is statistically significant in the first two estimations, but loses its significance after controlling for political trust. Regional differences are still observable, but the coefficient for CEE/FSU countries loses its significance after controlling for political trust. Also impact of interest in politics decreases after controlling for political trust.

Brewer et al. (2004) stress that the causality runs from social and political trust to international trust (see, e.g., p. 101). However, it can be criticized that social and political trust are endogenous. Similarly, it can be argued that the level of trust in the UN affects the perceptions about corruption and perhaps even the interest in politics. Thus, we conducted several 2SLS estimations providing detailed diagnostic tests to check the robustness of the results. We use a variable that measures social preferences as an instrument for social trust[12]. Political is instrumented through an index that measures the justifiability of tax evasion and claiming government benefits without being entitled to[13]. As an instrument for measuring corruption, we use the justifiability of accepting bribes[14]. Finally, being an active member in a political party has been used as an instrument for political interest. We report the three first-stage regression results of the instrumental variables (F-tests of the exclusion of the instruments). In a next step, we report the Anderson canonical correlations LR test for the relevance of the instruments, checking the relevance of the excluded instruments. A rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the model is identified and that the instruments are relevant (see Hall, Rudebusch and Wilcox 1996). In our case, the number of instruments does not exceed the number of endogenous regressors. Thus, the equation to be estimated is exactly identified. We also report the Anderson-Rubin test that the endogenous variables are jointly statistically significant. The test has the advantage of being robust to the presence of weak instruments. *Table 2* presents the results. We focus on two estimations: one with and one without political trust. In all cases the F-tests of the exclusion of the instrument set in the first-stage regression were statistically significant at the 1% level. The Anderson canonical

[12] Question: To build good human relationships, it is most important to try to understand others' preferences (value 1); To build good relationships, it is most important to express one's own preferences clearly.

[13] Question: Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: ..... Cheating on taxes if you have the chance. Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled (10="never justified" , 1= always). Index: sum of both questions, scale from 1 to 20.

[14] Question: Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between: ..... Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties (10="never justified" , 1= always).

correlations LR test shows rejection of the null hypothesis in both cases, which indicates that the models are identified and that the instruments are relevant. The Anderson-Rubin test is also statistically significant. In general, the 2SLS results support the previous findings, stressing the relevance of social and political trust. Also corruption shows the same impact as in the ordered probit estimations. Similarly, formal education and economic situation affect trust in the UN. However, the importance of an age and regional effect decreases. Interestingly, risk attitudes have a strong impact on trust in the UN. More risk averse individuals have a higher trust in the UN than the other ones.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Next, we report the effect of the independent variables in the four regions.[15] It can be argued that the observed effects in the panel of countries reported in *Table 1* are driven by one of the regions. It is also possible that some variables act differently in the different regions. *Tables 3* to *6* present these results. We first focus in *Table 3* on the determinants of trust in the UN in Western Europe, USA and Australia. In line with the pooled findings we observe that the trust in the state index and four sub-factors are highly statistically significant. Again we find that trust in the parliament produces the strongest externalities. Interestingly, generalized trust remains robust after including the political trust. Moreover, corruption shows a consistent negative coefficient in all four estimations. A higher perceived corruption crowds-out trust in the UN. Thus, strong support has been found that the level of trust generated at the local level affects trust at the international one. We also find now gender differences. Women have a higher level of trust than men. The coefficient is statistically significant in all four estimations with marginal effects of around 1.5 percentage points. On the other hand, formal and informal education is less important for understanding trust in the UN. Perhaps a higher

[15] Africa has not been considered independently, as Nigeria was the only African country in the data set.

overall level of education in developed countries leads to a lower effect of education. Married people show a lower level of trust, but the marginal effects are relatively small. There are also certain tendencies that being self-employed is correlated with a lower level of trust (statistically significant in two estimations). We can also find a consistent age effect, with the strongest quantitative effects for the age group 65+ followed by the age category 30-49.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

In CEE and FSU countries the age effect is less obvious (see *Table 4*). Only the age group 30-49 shows a statistically significant lower probability of trusting the UN. Contrary to Western societies, we observe a strong impact of education and income on trust in the UN. Both variables, formal education and political interest, indicate significant positive coefficients in all four estimations. On the other hand, individuals in the upper class show a lower level of trust in the UN. People who became rich might have been able to secure or establish their property rights after the rapid collapse of institutional structures that produced a vacuum in the country, followed by worsening income inequality and poverty rates. Their ability to succeed in such a system reduces their trust in international organizations which could change or affect their current situation. Being married is positively correlated with trust in the UN, but once we control for generalized trust the significance disappears. Similar findings are observed for church attendance. No negative effect has been found, probably due to the circumstances in transition countries. Communist countries tried to eradicate organized religion, regarding it as "competitive with the Communist quasi-religion" (Barro and McCleary 2002, p. 13). Thus, churches have profited from the transition process and they may see international organizations as supporters rather than competitors. The coefficient of corruption shows similarities with the pooled estimations, switching the sign after controlling for political trust. As for Western societies, the coefficient of generalized trust remains

statistically significant, although the marginal effects strongly decrease after controlling for political trust. Moreover, the index and the four trust in the state variables are statistically significant. Interestingly, the coefficient TRUST IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM has the strongest quantitative effects. An improvement in the institutional conditions at the constitutional level, a key factor in transition countries, should lead, ceteris paribus, to a higher level of trust in the UN.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

Next, we analyze Latin America. Again the age effect loses its significance. Contrary to Western societies women report a significantly lower trust in the UN. It can be expected that the discrimination argument provided by Alesina and La Ferrara works stronger in Latin America. Church attendance has a positive effect on trust, but its effect is not statistically significant anymore after including political trust. Similarly, corruption is negatively associated with trust in the first two estimations, but not in the last two. Generalized trust is statistically significant when including political trust. Also, we observe that the index and the four sub-factors are statistically significant with high marginal effects (highest value for trust in the parliament).

[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

Finally, we investigate in *Table 6* the determinants of trust in the UN in Asian countries. Interestingly, we find that risk attitudes have a strong impact on our dependent variable. Risk averse individuals have a higher level of trust in the UN than the reference group. The marginal effects are quite substantial. This result corresponds to the pooled 2SLS regressions. In line with Western societies we find that women have a higher level of trust than men.

Similarly, formal education has no impact on the level of trust. However, political interest has a stronger impact on trust in the UN, showing relatively high marginal effects (between 1.8 and 2.4 percentage points). On the other hand, there is no age and formal education effect. Moreover, being married is negatively correlated with trust in the UN. There is a tendency that individuals in the upper class are less willing to trust the UN, but the coefficient is mostly not statistically significant. Church attendance and corruption show results in line with Latin America. Surprisingly, generalized trust is negatively correlated with trust on the international level. The results are quite robust with relatively high marginal effects. Thus, positive externalities are not observable. On the contrary, a stronger connection to strangers reduces the willingness to trust international institutions. In line with all the previous regional findings, we can see that trust in the state index is statistically significant. Moreover, also most of the sub-values are statistically significant (except trust in political parties). Trust in the parliament and trust in the government provide the strongest positive externalities.

[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the last couple of years, the number of social capital studies has been growing. However, Brewer et al. (2004) criticize the lack of empirical studies that have studied international trust and urge that social and political trust are not the only forms of trust that future research should study. Thus, this empirical study analyses the determinants of trust in international organizations focusing on the United Nations. We have worked with a broad data set that covers not less than 38 countries with a cross-section of individuals from the World Values Survey wave III (1995-1997). We investigate not only regional differences but have conducted estimations for various geographic sub-samples to compare the relevance of our

independent variables in different environments. In general, we observe strong externalities. Political trust at the state level leads to a higher trust at the international level. On the other hand, perceptions of a dysfunctional state lead to a reduction of trust at the international level. Thus, the UN as an international institution profits from the performances at the local/state level. People who are cynical about domestic politics are also more cynical about international institutions. Citizens who believe that their own government does not fulfill their expectations may reason that international bodies may even be less able to satisfy their preferences. Our results suggest that political trust at the state level is a key factor to understand the level of international trust. The index and the four individual factors that cover legal system, government, parliament and political parties were in almost all estimations statistically significant, showing high marginal effects. We also find that generalized trust matters, but it shapes trust in the UN to a lesser extent. A negative correlation between corruption and trust in the UN is well visible in Western societies. On the other hand, once controlled for the level of political trust in other regions, a higher level of corruption is associated with a higher level of trust which indicates that the UN may offer an alternative channel to increase hope and resolve problems in more dysfunctional states and regions. In such countries, citizens have fewer possibilities to express their preferences and control the government. Thus, individuals have an incentive to pursue their goals through other channels or to develop trust in international organization that may help to change the current situation. The results remain robust after conducting several 2SLS estimations.

One of the major advantages of the data set is that different cultural regions can be investigated, i.e. we can assess the cross-culture robustness of our investigated variables. The results indicate that there are differences between regions. Interestingly, inhabitants of Latin America, Asian and CEE/FSU countries have a higher level of trust than Western societies. The results are especially robust for the first two regions. Moreover, we not only observe regional differences in the level of trust in the UN, but also certain differences among the

determinants that shape trust in the UN. For example, risk attitudes have a strong impact on the level of trust in the UN in Asia, but not in other regions. However, although we work with an extensive survey, the interpretation of regional differences should be treated with caution, as only a limited number of countries are available in each category. In general, we observe the tendency that formal education and political interest are positively correlated with a higher trust in the UN. On the other hand, the highest economic class shows the lowest probability of trusting the UN.

In general, our findings can be useful in order to create and maintain social capital at the international level. We find strong support for externalities. Situations at the state level strongly affect individuals' attitudes at the international level. All kinds of efforts at the local and state level help to assure the trust in international organizations and therefore their legitimacy.

We should note that the nature of trust in the UN might differ when we investigate different parts of the UN. Our question measures the general confidence in the UN, but it may be interesting to focus also on specific factors such as trust in the Secretary-General, the United Nations Secretariat, the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council or the International Court of Justice. The complex nature of the UN requires a multi-dimensional approach to fully understand the level of trust in such an international institution. Moreover, it would be highly interesting to observe the level of trust in the UN over time, as international organizations are also affected by changes. So, reforms are interesting aspects to investigate as e.g. the proposals for an overhaul of the United Nations Secretariat Kofi Annan presented in March 2006. In his opinion the organization's rules, systems and culture need significant retooling and investment (http://www.un.org/reform/). If these reforms are realized, it will be highly interesting to investigate how such changes affect citizens' trust.

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Table 1: Trust in the UN

WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT	*Coeff.*	*z-Stat.*	*Marg.*	*Coeff.*	*z-Stat.*	*Marg.*	*Coeff.*	*z-Stat.*	*Marg.*	*Coeff.*	*z-Stat.*	*Marg.*
a) Demographic Factors												
AGE 30-49	-0.099***	-6.35	-0.022	-0.100***	-6.37	-0.023	-0.083***	-5.08	-0.018	-0.083***	-5.08	-0.018
AGE 50-64	-0.031	-1.57	-0.007	-0.036*	-1.80	-0.008	-0.033	-1.61	-0.007	-0.034*	-1.69	-0.007
AGE 65+	-0.062**	-2.55	-0.014	-0.063**	-2.56	-0.014	-0.104***	-4.14	-0.021	-0.105***	-4.18	-0.021
FEMALE	0.005	0.40	0.001	0.003	0.22	0.001	0.009	0.72	0.002	0.010	0.80	0.002
b) Education												
FORMAL	0.030***	10.60	0.007	0.029***	10.01	0.007	0.039***	13.06	0.008	0.039***	12.95	0.008
POLITICAL INTEREST	0.055***	7.58	0.013	0.054***	7.31	0.012	0.006	0.74	0.001	0.012	1.52	0.002
c) Marital Status												
MARRIED	-0.004	-0.27	-0.001	-0.006	-0.43	-0.001	-0.025*	-1.73	-0.005	-0.025*	-1.74	-0.005
d) Economic Variables												
UPPER CLASS	-0.128***	-2.57	-0.027	-0.140***	-2.74	-0.030	-0.209***	-3.96	-0.040	-0.206***	-3.93	-0.039
e) Employment Status												
SELFEMPLOYED	-0.011	-0.48	-0.002	-0.008	-0.36	-0.002	0.009	0.40	0.002	0.008	0.35	0.002
f) Risk Attitudes												
RISK AVERSE	-0.013	-0.98	-0.003	-0.005	-0.37	-0.001	0.005	0.35	0.001	0.003	0.25	0.001
g) Religiosity												
CHURCH ATTENDANCE	0.016***	4.86	0.004	0.015***	4.59	0.004	-0.007**	-2.01	-0.001	-0.007**	-2.14	-0.002
h) Institutional Quality												
CORRUPTION	-0.095***	-11.77	-0.022	-0.088***	-10.69	-0.020	0.023***	2.71	0.005	0.026***	3.05	0.006
i) Trust												
OTHERS				0.090***	6.40	0.021	0.022	1.53	0.005	0.020	1.41	0.004
INDEX TRUST IN THE STATE							0.145***	49.05	0.031			
LEGAL SYSTEM										0.161***	16.99	0.034
GOVERNMENT										0.133***	12.07	0.028
POLITICAL PARTIES										0.079***	6.80	0.017
PARLIAMENT										0.199***	16.29	0.042
j) Regions												
CEE and FSU	0.194***	12.74	0.045	0.207***	13.34	0.049	0.148***	9.24	0.032	0.151***	9.31	0.033
LATIN AMERICA	0.172***	8.53	0.041	0.192***	9.31	0.047	0.199***	9.66	0.045	0.207***	9.96	0.047
ASIA	0.588***	28.97	0.166	0.595***	28.89	0.169	0.389***	18.14	0.097	0.398***	18.47	0.099
AFRICA	0.515***	8.93	0.148	0.530***	9.01	0.153	0.484***	7.50	0.131	0.504***	7.90	0.137
Pseudo R2	0.015			0.015			0.056			0.057		
Number of observations	36618			35425			33740			33740		
Prob > chi2	0.000			0.000			0.000			0.000		

Notes: Robust standard errors. In the reference group are AGE<30, MALE, OTHER MARRIED ST., OTHER CLASSES, OTHER EMPLOY. ST., RISK TAKERS, WESTERN EUROPE/USA/AUSTRALIA. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. CEE: Central Eastern European Countries, FSU: Former Soviet Union Countries.

Table 2: 2SLS Estimations

2SLS	*Coeff.*	*t-stat.*	*Coeff.*	*t-sta.*
a) Demographic Factors				
AGE 30-49	-0.085***	-3.75	-0.026	-0.63
AGE 50-64	-0.010	-0.33	0.053	1.01
AGE 65+	0.057	1.16	0.076	1.08
FEMALE	-0.068***	-2.68	-0.123***	-2.92
b) Education				
FORMAL	0.016**	2.24	0.050***	3.60
POLITICAL INTEREST	-0.090	-1.38	-0.458***	-2.67
c) Marital Status				
MARRIED	0.017	0.90	-0.012	-0.49
d) Economic Variables				
UPPER CLASS	-0.244***	-3.25	-0.356***	-3.01
e) Employment Status				
SELFEMPLOYED	-0.032	-0.98	-0.015	-0.36
f) Risk Attitudes				
RISK AVERSE	0.085***	2.69	0.105**	2.21
g) Religiosity				
CHURCH ATTENDANCE	0.017***	3.80	-0.015	-1.08
h) Institutional Quality				
CORRUPTION	0.699**	2.44	1.085**	2.27
i) Trust				
OTHERS	2.268***	3.57	2.27***	2.76
INDEX TRUST IN THE STATE			0.262**	2.54
LEGAL SYSTEM				
GOVERNMENT				
POLITICAL PARTIES				
PARLIAMENT				
j) Regions				
CEE and FSU	0.039	0.40	-0.160	-0.90
LATIN AMERICA	0.208**	2.57	0.070	0.52
ASIA	0.597***	8.61	0.024	0.09
AFRICA	0.177	1.05	-0.083	-0.29
First-stage regressions:				
Test of excluded instruments:				
POLITICAL INTEREST	368.85***		251.28***	
CORRUPTION	52.04***		44.72***	
TRUSTING OTHERS	53.07***		31.48***	
INDEX TRUST IN THE STATE			70.53***	
Underidentification tests:				
Anderson canon. corr. likelihood ratio stat.	21.34***		10.59***	
nderson-Rubin test of joint significance of endogenous regressors	16.60***		12.08***	
Number of observations	31686		28392	
Prob > F	0.000		0.000	

Notes: Robust standard errors. In the reference group are AGE<30, MALE, OTHER MARRIED ST., OTHER CLASSES, OTHER EMPLOY. ST., RISK TAKERS, WESTERN EUROPE/USA/AUSTRALIA. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. CEE/FSU: Central Eastern Europ. and Former Soviet Union nat.

Table 3: Trust in the UN in Western Europe, USA, Australia

WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT	*Coeff.*	*z-Stat.*	*Marg.*	*Coeff.*	*z-Stat.*	*Marg.*	*Coeff.*	*z-Stat.*	*Marg.*	*Coeff.*	*z-Stat.*	*Marg.*
a) Demographic Factors												
AGE 30-49	-0.180***	-5.58	-0.025	-0.195***	-5.97	-0.027	-0.147***	-4.35	-0.018	-0.147***	-4.34	-0.018
AGE 50-64	-0.130***	-3.30	-0.018	-0.145***	-3.63	-0.019	-0.113***	-2.77	-0.013	-0.113***	-2.77	-0.013
AGE 65+	-0.208***	-4.74	-0.027	-0.219***	-4.94	-0.028	-0.202***	-4.55	-0.022	-0.197***	-4.40	-0.022
FEMALE	0.110***	4.57	0.016	0.097***	4.00	0.014	0.108***	4.37	0.013	0.106***	4.28	0.013
b) Education												
FORMAL	-0.007	-1.34	-0.001	-0.011*	-1.93	-0.002	-0.004	-0.63	-0.0004	-0.004	-0.77	-0.001
POLITICAL INTEREST	0.004	0.31	0.001	0.001	0.06	0.0001	-0.032**	-2.22	-0.004	-0.038**	-2.57	-0.005
c) Marital Status												
MARRIED	-0.058**	-2.19	-0.008	-0.052*	-1.94	-0.007	-0.073***	-2.65	-0.009	-0.072***	-2.62	-0.009
d) Economic Variables												
UPPER CLASS	0.112	0.95	0.017	0.105	0.88	0.016	0.027	0.25	0.003	0.032	0.28	0.004
e) Employment Status												
SELFEMPLOYED	-0.075	-1.48	-0.010	-0.076	-1.47	-0.010	-0.101**	-1.99	-0.012	-0.103**	-2.04	-0.012
f) Risk Attitudes												
RISK AVERSE	-0.010	-0.39	-0.001	0.004	0.17	0.001	-0.015	-0.56	-0.002	-0.015	-0.56	-0.002
g) Religiosity												
CHURCH ATTENDANCE	0.007	1.19	0.001	0.006	0.99	0.001	-0.029***	-4.62	-0.004	-0.029***	-4.57	-0.003
h) Institutional Quality												
CORRUPTION	-0.197***	-12.21	-0.028	-0.172***	-10.31	-0.025	-0.039**	-2.29	-0.005	-0.040**	-2.32	-0.005
i) Trust												
OTHERS				0.222***	8.66	0.033	0.121***	4.63	0.015	0.117***	4.50	0.015
INDEX TRUST IN THE STATE							0.181***	28.06	0.022			
LEGAL SYSTEM										0.182***	9.64	0.022
GOVERNMENT										0.089***	3.88	0.011
POLITICAL PARTIES										0.199***	7.82	0.024
PARLIAMENT										0.263***	10.17	0.032
Pseudo R2	0.012			0.016			0.067			0.067		
Number of observations	9387			9193			8901			8901		
Prob > chi2	0.000			0.000			0.00			0.00		

Notes: Robust standard errors. In the reference group are AGE<30, MALE, OTHER MARRIED ST., OTHER CLASSES, OTHER EMPLOY. ST., RISK TAKERS, WESTERN EUROPE/USA/AUSTRALIA. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.

Table 4: Trust in the UN in CEE and FSU countries

WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT	*Coeff.*	*z-Stat.*	*Marg.*	*Coeff.*	*z-Stat.*	*Marg.*	*Coeff.*	*z-Stat.*	*Marg.*	*Coeff.*	*z-Stat.*	*Marg.*
a) Demographic Factors												
AGE 30-49	-0.112***	-4.65	-0.026	-0.114***	-4.61	-0.026	-0.104***	-4.05	-0.022	-0.105***	-4.11	-0.023
AGE 50-64	-0.017	-0.57	-0.004	-0.029	-0.97	-0.007	-0.028	-0.90	-0.006	-0.031	-0.99	-0.007
AGE 65+	0.001	0.03	0.000	-0.003	-0.08	-0.001	-0.053	-1.31	-0.011	-0.058	-1.45	-0.012
FEMALE	0.008	0.39	0.002	0.005	0.24	0.001	0.001	0.06	0.000	0.001	0.06	0.000
b) Education												
FORMAL	0.055***	11.71	0.013	0.051***	10.57	0.012	0.062***	12.33	0.014	0.062***	12.34	0.014
POLITICAL INTEREST	0.063***	5.33	0.015	0.062***	5.09	0.014	0.026**	2.02	0.006	0.032**	2.49	0.007
c) Marital Status												
MARRIED	0.059***	2.79	0.013	0.054**	2.48	0.012	0.033	1.46	0.007	0.034	1.52	0.007
d) Economic Variables												
UPPER CLASS	-0.271***	-3.59	-0.054	-0.299***	-3.81	-0.059	-0.393***	-4.30	-0.068	-0.383***	-4.23	-0.067
e) Employment Status												
SELFEMPLOYED	-0.019	-0.43	-0.004	-0.027	-0.59	-0.006	-0.012	-0.26	-0.003	-0.015	-0.30	-0.003
f) Risk Attitudes												
RISK AVERSE	-0.013	-0.59	-0.003	-0.003	-0.15	-0.001	0.016	0.72	0.004	0.012	0.53	0.003
g) Religiosity												
CHURCH ATTENDANCE	0.021***	3.54	0.005	0.019***	3.12	0.004	0.006	1.03	0.001	0.007	1.13	0.002
h) Institutional Quality												
CORRUPTION	-0.070***	-5.31	-0.016	-0.061***	-4.50	-0.014	0.063***	4.34	0.014	0.069***	4.77	0.015
i) Trust												
OTHERS				0.102***	4.54	0.024	0.064***	2.73	0.014	0.063***	2.69	0.014
INDEX TRUST IN THE STATE							0.123***	27.19	0.027			
LEGAL SYSTEM										0.167***	10.93	0.036
GOVERNMENT										0.113***	6.51	0.025
POLITICAL PARTIES										0.063***	3.61	0.014
PARLIAMENT										0.147***	7.83	0.032
Pseudo R2	0.008			0.008			0.039			0.039		
Number of observations	14857			14210			13192			13192		
Prob > chi2	0.000			0.000			0.000			0.000		

Notes: Robust standard errors. In the reference group are AGE<30, MALE, OTHER MARRIED ST., OTHER CLASSES, OTHER EMPLOY. ST., RISK TAKERS, WESTERN EUROPE/USA/AUSTRALIA. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.

Table 5: Trust in the UN in Latin American Countries

WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT	*Coeff.*	*z-Stat.*	*Marg.*	*Coeff.*	*z-Stat.*	*Marg.*	*Coeff.*	*z-Stat.*	*Marg.*	*Coeff.*	*z-Stat.*	*Marg.*
a) Demographic Factors												
AGE 30-49	-0.079**	-2.31	-0.021	-0.073**	-2.10	-0.020	-0.058	-1.64	-0.015	-0.056	-1.57	-0.014
AGE 50-64	0.000	0.00	0.000	0.014	0.30	0.004	-0.014	-0.30	-0.004	-0.012	-0.26	-0.003
AGE 65+	-0.039	-0.61	-0.010	-0.027	-0.41	-0.007	-0.116*	-1.82	-0.028	-0.111*	-1.75	-0.027
FEMALE	-0.114***	-4.06	-0.031	-0.111***	-3.88	-0.030	-0.100***	-3.42	-0.025	-0.094***	-3.20	-0.024
b) Education												
FORMAL	0.044***	6.35	0.012	0.045***	6.50	0.012	0.066***	9.35	0.017	0.065***	9.14	0.016
POLITICAL INTEREST	0.086***	5.60	0.023	0.089***	5.70	0.024	-0.001	-0.07	-0.0003	0.011	0.67	0.003
c) Marital Status												
MARRIED	0.002	0.07	0.001	-0.006	-0.20	-0.002	-0.026	-0.85	-0.007	-0.031	-1.00	-0.008
d) Economic Variables												
UPPER CLASS	-0.062	-0.38	-0.016	-0.090	-0.55	-0.023	-0.173	-1.18	-0.040	-0.156	-1.06	-0.036
e) Employment Status												
SELFEMPLOYED	-0.098**	-2.44	-0.026	-0.091**	-2.22	-0.024	-0.040	-0.94	-0.010	-0.043	-1.03	-0.011
f) Risk Attitudes												
RISK AVERSE	-0.048	-1.63	-0.013	-0.049	-1.64	-0.013	-0.029	-0.95	-0.007	-0.029	-0.96	-0.007
g) Religiosity												
CHURCH ATTENDANCE	0.030***	4.30	0.008	0.029***	4.06	0.008	0.008	1.07	0.002	0.004	0.61	0.001
h) Institutional Quality												
CORRUPTION	-0.086***	-5.22	-0.023	-0.086***	-5.10	-0.023	0.021	1.23	0.005	0.024	1.37	0.006
i) Trust												
OTHERS				-0.040	-1.03	-0.011	-0.176***	-4.52	-0.042	-0.168***	-4.28	-0.040
INDEX TRUST IN THE STATE							0.166***	26.72	0.042			
LEGAL SYSTEM										0.135***	6.97	0.034
GOVERNMENT										0.207***	9.80	0.052
POLITICAL PARTIES										0.059**	2.37	0.015
PARLIAMENT										0.249***	10.10	0.063
Pseudo R2	0.012			0.012			0.069			0.069		
Number of observations	6416			6245			6099			6099		
Prob > chi2	0.000			0.000			0.000			0.000		

Notes: Robust standard errors. In the reference group are AGE<30, MALE, OTHER MARRIED ST., OTHER CLASSES, OTHER EMPLOY. ST., RISK TAKERS, WESTERN EUROPE/USA/AUSTRALIA. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.

Table 6: Trust in the UN in Asian Countries

WEIGHTED ORDERED PROBIT	*Coeff.*	*z-Stat.*	*Marg.*	*Coeff.*	*z-Stat.*	*Marg.*	*Coeff.*	*z-Stat.*	*Marg.*	*Coeff.*	*z-Stat.*	*Marg.*
a) Demographic Factors												
AGE 30-49	0.016	0.40	0.005	0.022	0.54	0.007	0.031	0.75	0.009	0.032	0.77	0.009
AGE 50-64	0.053	0.86	0.016	0.062	1.01	0.019	0.073	1.17	0.022	0.068	1.11	0.020
AGE 65+	0.023	0.21	0.007	0.019	0.17	0.006	-0.088	-0.76	-0.025	-0.088	-0.76	-0.025
FEMALE	0.060*	1.70	0.018	0.062*	1.74	0.019	0.084**	2.32	0.025	0.082**	2.26	0.024
b) Education												
FORMAL	0.005	0.53	0.001	0.005	0.51	0.001	-0.002	-0.24	-0.001	-0.003	-0.32	-0.001
POLITICAL INTEREST	0.082***	3.96	0.025	0.084***	4.04	0.025	0.056***	2.63	0.017	0.059***	2.78	0.017
c) Marital Status												
MARRIED	-0.098**	-2.41	-0.030	-0.099**	-2.42	-0.030	-0.133***	-3.21	-0.040	-0.136***	-3.27	-0.041
d) Economic Variables												
UPPER CLASS	-0.179*	-1.78	-0.051	-0.148	-1.38	-0.042	-0.128	-1.20	-0.036	-0.136	-1.28	-0.038
e) Employment Status												
SELFEMPLOYED	0.157***	3.46	0.049	0.157***	3.44	0.049	0.166***	3.65	0.051	0.167***	3.66	0.051
f) Risk Attitudes												
RISK AVERSE	0.068**	1.99	0.021	0.068**	1.98	0.021	0.085**	2.43	0.025	0.085**	2.41	0.025
g) Religiosity												
CHURCH ATTENDANCE	0.023***	2.69	0.007	0.019**	2.23	0.006	-0.012	-1.32	-0.004	-0.013	-1.37	-0.004
h) Institutional Quality												
CORRUPTION	-0.047**	-2.06	-0.014	-0.052**	-2.27	-0.016	0.002	0.08	0.001	0.005	0.22	0.002
i) Trust												
OTHERS				-0.122***	-2.89	-0.036	-0.167***	-3.77	-0.047	-0.167***	-3.77	-0.047
INDEX TRUST IN THE STATE							0.135***	16.38	0.040			
LEGAL SYSTEM										0.142***	5.32	0.042
GOVERNMENT										0.175***	5.31	0.051
POLITICAL PARTIES										0.053	1.59	0.016
PARLIAMENT										0.174***	5.23	0.051
Pseudo R2	0.006			0.007			0.045			0.045		
Number of observations	4373			4282			4169			4169		
Prob > chi2	0.000			0.000			0.000			0.000		

Notes: Robust standard errors. In the reference group are AGE<30, MALE, OTHER MARRIED ST., OTHER CLASSES, OTHER EMPLOY. ST., RISK TAKERS, WESTERN EUROPE/USA/AUSTRALIA. *,** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.

APPENDIX

Table A1

Description of Variables

Variable	**Derivation**
AGE	DUMMIES AGE 30-49, AGE 50-64, 65+ (reference group, AGE < 30)
GENDER	FEMALE (MALE in the reference group)
EDUCATION	Continuous variable What is the highest educational level that you have attained? 1. No formal education 2. Incomplete primary school 3. Completed primary school 4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type 5. Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type 6. Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type 7. Complete secondary: university-preparatory type 8. Some university-level education, without degree 9. University-level education, with degree
RISK AVERSE	Now I would like to ask you something about the things which would seem to you personally, most important if you were looking a job. Here are some of the things many people take into account in relation to their work. Regardless of whether you're actually looking for a job, which one would you, personally, place first if you were looking for a job? 1. A good income so that you do not have any worries about money 2. A safe job with no risk of closing down or unemployment 3. Working with people you like 4. Doing an important job which gives you a feeling of accomplishment And what would be your second choice? A dummy variable was built with the value 1, if someone has chosen 2 as first or as second choice.
CHURCH ATTENDANCE	Apart from weddings, funerals, and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days? More than once a week, once a week, once a month, only on special holy days, once a year, less often, never or practically never. (7 = more than once a week to 1 = never or practically never)
ECONOMIC CLASS	People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the: DUMMY: UPPER CLASS, the rest (middle class, working class and lower class) is the reference group.
EMPLOYMENT STATUS	DUMMY: SELFEMPLOYED, the rest (unemployed, part time and full-time employed, at home, student, retired, other) is in the reference group.
CORRUPTION	To assess the level of perceived corruption from the WVS, we use the following question: How widespread do you think bribe taking and corruption is in this country? Almost no public officials are engaged in it (1) A few public officials are engaged in it (2) Most public officials are engaged in it (3)

	Almost all public officials are engaged in it (4)
TRUST	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in your dealings with people? (1=most people can be trusted, 0=can't be too careful).
TRUST IN THE SYSTEM	Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the legal system: Do you have a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or no confidence at all? (4=a great deal of confidence to 1=no confidence at all).
TRUST IN GOVERNMENT	Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the government in your capital: Do you have a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or no confidence at all? (4=a great deal of confidence to 1=no confidence at all).
TRUST IN PARLIAMENT	Could you tell me how much confidence you have in parliament: Do you have a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or no confidence at all? (4=a great deal of confidence to 1=no confidence at all).
TRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES	Could you tell me how much confidence you have in political parties: Do you have a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or no confidence at all? (4=a great deal of confidence to 1=no confidence at all).
INDEX TRUST IN THE STATE	Sum of all four trust in the state factors (scale from 1 to 16).

Source: Inglehart et al. (2000).